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Summary 
 
 
This thesis is the result of a research into the attitude of members of the Dutch Communist 
Party, CPN and labour union, EVC, towards cooperation with social democrats during the 
years 1945-1950. Primary sources from the CPN-archive in the IISH and relevant secondary 
sources have been researched. The most important conclusion is that the transition from a 
cooperative attitude to an attitude of isolation, which started in 1947 and was finished by the 
end of 1948, is best explained by domestic causes. Pressure from the Soviet Union played a 
significant role and pressure from the United States played only a marginal role. These three 
causes are distinguished in Boxhoorn’s model, which forms the theoretical background of this 
thesis. This model has also been criticized: first, it is too static and does not acknowledge the 
influences the causes from the three categories had on each other and second and most 
important, a fourth model of influence from other Western European Communist Parties, 
independent from the Soviet Union and United States can be added. This thesis has 
contributed to the idea that the period between the end of World War II and the start of the 
Cold War was a period of its own during which there were a lot of possibilities. The Cold War 
was only the one that became reality, but this was never inevitable. Peaceful coexistence and 
cooperation between communism and capitalism was perfectly possible as well. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Since 1909, for almost 35 years, the workers’ party in our land has been divided. The 
battle between social democrats and communists has gone on for too long. It is time to 
end the division. (...) Therefore a mighty, unified workers’ party, on the basis of 
scientific socialism and strengthened by the ripe experiences of half a century of Dutch 
workers’ struggle, must be established. This is the task, we propose to you to fulfil with 
us together.1 
 
In the period lying behind us we have offered unity to the social democracy, and also 
partly worked together with her. Now we have to form a front against her. Without the 
help of the social democracy, our own reaction would not have been able to wage a 
colonial war and the international reaction would not have been able to prepare a war 
against the Soviet Union (...) Under these circumstances we cannot do anything else but 
to speak out against the PVDA [the new social democratic party, called Partij van de 
Arbeid (Party of the Labour), established in 1946 after the merger of several parties, of 
which the SDAP was the biggest and most influential].2 
 
 
These two quotes, one from a letter signed by the Party Board of the CPN and the other from 
party leader Paul de Groot, reflect the CPN’s radical change in its attitude towards 
cooperation with the Dutch social democratic party in the first years after World War II. This 
is a very interesting development and the goal of this thesis will be to investigate which 
factors were most important in causing this radical change. 
 World War II had damaged the world badly: both the economic and political system 
had collapsed. The Netherlands, which had been occupied by the German army between 1940 
and 1945, was – just like the other countries of Western Europe – politically, economically 
and physically destroyed. In particular, the Dutch economy had been exploited to help pay for 
German war activities. During the first years of the war this had been a positive stimulus for 
the Dutch economy, but after 1942 the Germans had stopped paying for the goods they took 
from the Netherlands and Dutch machinery and workers had been abducted and taken to 
                                                          
1 IISH-CPN, inv. nr 270, Brief van het Partij Bestuur van de CPN aan het Partij Bestuur van de SDAP, 1 Sept. 
1945, pp. 1, 4. 
2 IISH-CPN, inv. nr. 360, Notulen van het Partij Bestuur, 28 Sept. 1947. 
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Germany to increase industrial production there.3 This had virtually destroyed the Dutch 
economy and at least one thing was clear after World War II in the Netherlands: the country 
had to recover from all the war damage and the entire economy had to be rebuilt. 
 In 1945 the CPN recognised the importance of cooperation for this reconstruction. 
During the war the communists had played an important role in the resistance against the 
German occupier and after the war the friendships and alliances formed in this resistance 
turned out to be very helpful for the reconstruction of the Netherlands. The Communist Party 
had always been sceptical of other political groups, but right after the war they were more 
willing to cooperate with them. They reached out to parties on the left-side of the political 
spectrum, especially the social democrats of the SDAP.4 
 By 1947 this cooperative attitude of the CPN began to disappear. The CPN started to 
condemn the SDAP, as well as the Schermerhorn-Drees of which they were a part, and other 
political parties. They especially blamed the social democrats for reactionary standpoints and 
selling out the Netherlands to the United States, they even started calling them socio-fascists.5 
 There is a lack of specific and substantial literature on this changing attitude of the 
CPN towards the social democrats and moreover it neglected the question of why it took 
place. Countries where communists had a more prominent role and where a comparable 
transformation has taken place have been researched more extensively. Boxhoorn, most 
notably, wrote in his dissertation about communists in Belgium, France and Italy. 
Communists were popular in those countries and in the last two countries they even had 
ministers in the government. However, during the spring of 1947 the Communist Parties in 
                                                          
3 J. Luiten van Zanden, Een klein land in de 20e eeuw: economische geschiedenis van Nederland 1914-1955 
(Utrecht, 1997), pp. 163-170. 
4 A. de Jonge, Het communisme in Nederland: de geschiedenis van een politieke partij (Den Haag, 1972), pp. 
77-92. 
5 G. Verrips, Dwars, duivels en dromend: de geschiedenis van de CPN 1938-1991 (Amsterdam, 1995), p. 295. 
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these countries became isolated.6 This was the same moment the CPN made its transition, 
therefore it would be interesting to examine whether or not the fate of the Communists in 
these countries played a role in the CPN’s attitude. 
 Boxhoorn investigated why the isolation of the Communists happened in the three 
countries at the same time and he has drawn up three hypotheses for this. First, the 
Washington model, which states that the communists were forced into isolation by American 
politicians. Second, the Moscow model, which states that they were bound by Soviet Union 
directives to take a harder stance against the social democrats. And third, the domestic model, 
which states that they became isolated because of internal, domestic developments in the three 
countries. Boxhoorn’s conclusion is that in Italy it was almost exclusively the domestic model 
which caused the isolation of the Communist Party. In France the domestic model was most 
important, while the Moscow model played a minor role and in Belgium the domestic model 
was most important, while the Washington model played a role.7 
 Historians have not written about the CPN and their attitude towards cooperation with 
the social democrats very extensively, but some have touched upon this subject. Verrips wrote 
in his book on the history of the CPN between 1938 and 1991 that the CPN mostly followed 
the line of the Soviet Union and the Comintern when deciding their attitude towards the social 
democrats. Stalin held at various moments different views about cooperation with the social 
democrats and what was the best way to become more powerful and the CPN followed this 
line.8 Verrips’ book is the most recent and best researched discussed here, he supports 
Boxhoorn’s Moscow model. However, Verrips has a strong personal bias, since he left the 
PVDA for the CPN and remained a member for decades. 
                                                          
6 A. Boxhoorn, The Cold War and the rift in Governments of national unity: Belgium, France, and Italy in the 
spring of 1947, a comparison (Amsterdam, 1993). 
7 Boxhoorn, The Cold War, pp. 245-250. 
8 Verrips, Dwars, duivels en dromend. 
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 De Jonge researched the general history of communism, not just the CPN, in the 
Netherlands during an earlier period (1909-1972). He concluded that communists and social 
democrats were inherently different and that communist parties only worked together with 
social democrats when the circumstances – both nationally and internationally – forced them 
to do so.9 De Jonge thus supports all three of Boxhoorn’s models. He is a former CPN-
member and his sources consist mainly of documents produced by the CPN and first-hand 
experiences of both himself and others. 
 Cusell and others focussed exclusively on the labour union policy of the CPN and they 
examined how the CPN tried to cooperated with social democrats to unite the working class 
for a collective economic fight against the capitalist Bourgeoisie. The authors concluded that 
this attitude was very close to Leninist ideology. In traditional, Marxist thought both the 
economic and political revolution had to be led by the largest number of workers possible. 
Lenin, however, made a distinction between the economic fight that had to be fought by 
labour unions and that had to be supported by the largest number of workers possible, and the 
political fight that had to be fought by the vanguard party, a smaller group of workers leading 
the class struggle. The authors thus concluded that the attitude of the CPN towards social 
democrats is the perfect reflection of this Leninist idea. They also concluded that the level of 
cooperation with social democrats was decided by how the revolution was perceived during 
different periods, with this they support the domestic model.10 The writers have a background 
of membership in the CPN and they mainly use secondary sources. 
 Coomans and others took a completely different approach than all the others, because 
they wrote the history of another organization: the Dutch communist labour union, EVC 
(Eenheidsvakcentrale, Unitarian Trade Central), during a narrower timeframe (1943-1948). 
Because communist workers worked alongside non-communist workers, the question of 
                                                          
9 De Jonge, Het communisme in Nederland, pp. 54-110. 
10 C. Cusell et. al., Over de eenheid van links. Een beschrijving van de CPN-politiek naar eenheid van de 
arbeidersbeweging (Den Haag, 1974), pp. 1-37. 
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cooperation with social democrats was very relevant for labour unions. The authors show how 
the CPN’s policy towards social democrats was reflected in the EVC’s strategy towards other, 
non-communist labour unions, even though the two were independent organizations with no 
official ties between each other.11 They used mainly secondary sources and left from a 
socialist perspective, which is contributed, by themselves, to their own political opinions. 
Because they left international politics completely out of their study, they could only analyze 
the influence of Boxhoorn’s domestic model. In this sense their study is quite incomplete, but 
it is crucial in showing the importance of the EVC and the CPN’s labour union strategy. 
Therefore, those subjects will also be treated in this thesis. 
 There are some problems with the works named in this historiographical overview: 
they are not recent and most authors are in one way or another involved in the CPN and write 
out of personal interest and involvement, this causes them to have a major bias. In this thesis 
an attempt will be made to overcome these problems. 
 This debate on the CPN’s attitude towards social democrats can be situated in a larger, 
more general historical debate on the Cold War. During the first years of the Cold War the 
orthodox, or classical historians, mainly from the United States, saw the conflict as 
exclusively caused by the Soviet Union and their expansionist policy in Eastern Europe.12 
From the 1960’s, the so-called revisionist historians blamed the United States for causing the 
Cold War with their aggressive anti-communist and anti-Soviet policy.13 Soon after, a third 
school of the so-called post-revisionists created a middle-ground between the two earlier 
schools and they produced a more nuanced and balanced view, concluding that the Cold War 
was inevitable because of the inherent differences between the Soviet Union and the United 
                                                          
11 P. Coomans et. al., De Eenheidsvakcentrale (EVC) 1943-1948 (Groningen, 1976), pp. 37-50, 117-258. 
12 T. Bailey, America faces Russia: Russian-American relations from early times to our day (Ithaca, 1950). 
13 Gar Alperovitz, Atomic diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam-The use of the atomic bomb and the American 
confrontation with Soviet power (New York, 1965; G. Kolko and J. Kolko, The limits of power: the world and 
United States foreign policy, 1945-1954 (New York, 1972); W. Appleman Williams, The tragedy of American 
diplomacy (Cleveland, 1959). 
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States and that the Cold War started when politicians on both sides refused to overcome these 
differences together. The Moscow model is supported by the argumentation of historians from 
the orthodox school, while the Washington is supported by historians from the revisionist 
school. The historians of the post-revisionist school try to incorporate factors from all three 
models in their explanations.14 
 The research question of this thesis, derived from the historiographical debate, is: why 
did the CPN change its attitude towards cooperation with social democrats so drastically 
during the first years after World War II (1945-1950)? This time frame is chosen because in 
1945 the situation from before the transformation was well-established and in 1950 the Cold 
War had escalated so far that cooperation between the CPN and social democrats was 
unthinkable, so it was no longer the case that it did not happen because of the CPN’s strategy. 
Boxhoorn’s tripartite scheme of hypotheses will be the theoretical framework of this thesis, 
therefore the question whether the domestic model, Moscow model, or Washington model 
explains the CPN’s transition best will be central. Where necessary, Boxhoorn’s theory will 
be adjusted for the Dutch situation. 
 To do so, primary sources from the CPN archive in the International Institute for 
Social History (IISH) in Amsterdam will form the backbone of the analysis in this thesis. The 
CPN archive had to be composed haphazardly from various sources, because the party had not 
kept a consistent and complete archive. Some parts of the archive are therefore missing or 
incomplete, but on the subject of this thesis there was enough material present in the archive. 
The bulk of the material used in this thesis will consist of documents from the national CPN, 
being minutes of the Party Board, the Managing Board, Party congresses and Party 
conferences and internal and external correspondence. These sources give a sufficient 
complete insight into thoughts on the subject of cooperation with social democrats in the top 
                                                          
14 J. Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York, 1972); T. 
Patterson, Soviet-American confrontation: post-war reconstruction and the origins of the Cold War (Baltimore, 
1973). 
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of the CPN. Next to these primary sources, a selection of relevant secondary literature will be 
used. Because of the nature of this research many sources and much of the secondary 
literature will be in Dutch. The advantage of this is that the sources and the work of scholars 
who researched those in their original language, not previously translated, will now become 
available to the wider academic world. The disadvantage is that it is more difficult to control 
for non-Dutch scholars. To overcome this problem, a translation of all the necessary quotes 
into English will be given by the author. The original quotations in Dutch can be found in 
appendix I (pp. 53-61). 
 In the first chapter of this thesis a historical background will be given of the 
relationship between the Dutch Communists and social democrats before the period analysed 
in the research question to introduce the reader to the subject of this thesis and help him or her 
to better understand the developments in the chapters after it. Then, the main argumentative 
part of this thesis is divided into two periods. In the second chapter the cooperative phase of 
the CPN (1945-1948) will be analyzed, and in the third chapter the isolationist phase of the 
CPN (1948-1950) will be examined. 
 In the fourth chapter the attitude of the EVC will be used as a comparative case study. 
It will demonstrate whether their leaders had the same, a comparable or a different attitude 
towards working together with social democrats during the first years after World War II. 
This will be done because of the importance of the CPN’s labour union strategy (as shown by 
Coomans and others) and because with this chapter it will also become possible to say 
something about how other Dutch Communists, besides the leaders of the CPN, thought about 
cooperation with social democrats. By providing the explanation for the EVC’s attitude the 
main argument developed in chapters two and three will be supported. If the explanation is 
similar or the same, it will reinforce it and if it is really different it will be put into 
perspective. In the conclusion all the arguments will be summarised, the main research 
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question will be answered and a clearer light will be shed on the history of Dutch 
Communists, their part in Dutch politics during the first years after World War II and what 
this says about the period directly after World War II. 
 When writing this thesis a great effort will be made to overcome what is the biggest 
danger for historians: to start from the present, then over interpret the past and in the end 
judge the past in terms of the present, in other words: the Whig interpretation of history.15 
That this is extremely difficult to overcome is shown by Benedetto Croce’s idea that every 
research into the past starts from amazement and questions in the present and his famous 
saying that ‘every history is contemporary history.’16 This same problem is part of what 
Hayden White has called ‘the burden of history.’17 The only solution to overcome this 
problem is to research the past for the sake of the past, based on terms from the past and, 
although they have to be critically analyzed, to let the sources speak for themselves as much 
as possible. Historical philosopher Robin George Collingwood’s scientific history is the best 
theory of what a historian should do.18 His famous adage said that ‘the history of thought, and 
therefore all history, is the re-enactment of past thought in the historian’s own mind.’19 
According to him the historian has to use his historical imagination to weigh the facts and 
complete the history by filling in the blanks between the fixed points of the facts.20 Another 
important condition for historical enquiry is that everything should be related to and compared 
with what other historians have said about the subject. The only possible way for a historian 
to contribute to historical understanding is to go into debate with other historians and add a 
little new insight or detail or an original perspective to what is already known. The research 
for this thesis has been executed with all these considerations in mind. 
                                                          
15 H. Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of history (London, 1931), pp. 9-26. 
16 B. Croce, Theory and history of historiography (London, 1921), pp. 11-26. 
17 H. White, ‘The burden of history’, History and Theory, 5, no. 2 (1966): pp. 111-134. 
18 M. Day, The philosophy of history: an introduction (London, 2008), pp. 16-19. 
19 R.G. Collingwood, ‘Epilegomena I: human nature and human history’ in R.G. Collingwood, The idea of 
history (Oxford, 1946), pp. 204-231 at p. 215.  
20 R.G. Collingwood, The historical imagination (Oxford, 1935), pp. 3-21. 
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Chapter I: 
Communists and social democrats  
before World War II 
 
 
This chapter will consist of three parts: first, the earliest days of the first communist party in 
the Netherlands, then the expanding of the party during the 1930’s and 1940’s and lastly the 
CPN during World War II. Hereby the focus will lay on showing the historical roots of the 
central issues and dilemmas of the period analyzed in the research question of this thesis. 
 
I.I Radical Marxists leaving the SDAP 
The Communist Party in the Netherlands was founded in 1909 after a group of radical and 
orthodox Marxists left the SDAP. They had led an opposition against the SDAP and their 
loose interpretation of Karl Marx from within the party for a decade, but now they seceded 
and they founded the SDP (Sociaaldemocratische Partij, Social Democratic Party). Thus they 
still felt connected to social democracy, which is also why they copied the principle program 
of the SDAP in 1909. But soon they opposed the SDAP, which was quite logical, since the 
reason why they seceded originally was also criticism of that party.1 
 The Netherlands was the only country, next to Russia, where a division between 
orthodox Marxists and revisionist social democrats already existed before World War I. De 
Jonge argues that because of this Dutch Communism was highly developed as a separate 
ideology and that Dutch Communists were therefore difficult to be controlled by the Soviet 
Union later on. The ideas, particular to Dutch Communism, he names are: the focus, until 
after World War II, on a collective leadership and the influence of intellectual ideas.2 De 
Jonge’s argument makes sense, because it is easier to put a new idea in place if there is 
                                                          
1 Verrips, Dwars, duivels en dromend, pp. 3-13. 
2 De Jonge, Het communisme in Nederland, pp. 9-19. 
13 
 
nothing there before, than to replace old ideas with new ideas. In earlier times these two ideas 
were very central and visible, but also in later times they left their traces. This argument 
shows that there are certain problems with the Moscow model and how easily Boxhoorn – and 
other historians – have accepted the influence of the Soviet Union on the CPN and their 
policy, even though at certain times that influence has been very much visible. 
 When the October Revolution broke out in Russia in 1917 and the bolsjewiki, which 
would later form the Communist Party, took over power, the SDP welcomed this, they hoped 
to start a revolution in the Netherlands too. However, because they were the only Dutch party 
to maintain a staunchly anti-war attitude during World War I, they accomplished an electoral 
breakthrough around that same time. A similar phenomenon was also visible in the Soviet 
Union were the Bolshevik Party got a lot of support because of their denunciation of World 
War I, which they saw as an imperialist conflict.3 This posed a dilemma for the SDP: they 
either had to keep true to their orthodox Marxist strategy to maintain and enlarge their 
electoral successes or cash in their electoral victory and start working together with the social 
democrats in Parliament, with the risk that this made them more revisionist, which could 
eventually lead to losing their electoral victories of the period before. 
 
II.II Soviets taking control 
In 1919 the SDP abandoned their social democratic name and called the party 
Communistische Partij in Nederland (CPN, Communist Party in the Netherlands) and they 
joined the organization of international communists, Comintern. In 1922 they even added 
Afdeling of sectie van de Derde Internationale (Department or section of the Third 
International) to their name. During the 1920’s they used the name Communistische Partij 
Holland (CPH, Communist Party Holland), because Holland was more commonly used 
                                                          
3 P. Kenez, A history of the Soviet Union from the beginning to the end (Cambridge, 2006), p. 31. 
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internationally. These changes in the names of the party show how they distanced themselves 
from social democracy and how they became more international. It thus seemed that they 
chose the first option of the dilemma dealt with in the previous paragraph. That the Dutch 
Communists became more internationalist and a prominent member of the Comintern is an 
argument for the case that the Moscow model was becoming more important during this 
period. 
 In the early 1920’s a struggle for power within the CPH arose. There were three 
parties fighting over the power: the leaders of the party in the Party Board, the opposition 
from within the party, which was purely power-based and not ideological at all, and the 
Comintern, which tried to increase its influence over the CPH. After a few years of simmering 
conflict within the party, the battle intensified in the years 1925-1930, when the opposition 
established its own party in 1926, which competed with the CPH in a propaganda war, and in 
elections.4 
 This conflict only ended in 1930, when the Soviet Union chose the side of the original 
CPH, which had become more left-wing than the opposition. This can be explained by the fact 
that by then Stalin had firmly established his rule within the Soviet Union and he looked 
abroad to establish his influence there as well. In return, the CPH became more lenient to 
Soviet and Comintern directions. This certainly points in the direction of an increase in 
importance of the Moscow model, although the CPH always kept their original ideas alive to 
some extent.5 
 From 1930 onwards the CPH accomplished a second breakthrough. During World 
War I they won a lot of votes amongst the radical-left electorate, but now they also managed 
to win votes amongst social democrats. Paradoxically, they did this by aggressively attacking 
the SDAP. During this period they also attacked the nation-state, the bourgeois democracy, 
                                                          
4 De Jonge, Communisme in Nederland, pp. 34-53. 
5 Verrips, Dwars, duivels en dromend, pp. 3-16. 
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religion and Christian democracy. During the elections for the Dutch provincial Parliament, 
Provinciale Staten (States-Provincial), in 1935 the CPH reached its pre-war electoral 
maximum of 3.4% of the votes.6 The fact that the CPH could grow so much during a period in 
which they were so radical was first of all because of the (economic) circumstances in the 
Netherlands at the time and second because of the style of leadership of the CPH. Just like in 
the Soviet Union, the party was now led by the apparatchiki, who were full-time, professional 
functionaries of the Communist Party or government. They were often bureaucrats, whose 
aim was to execute Party directions directly, without any practical or ideological 
considerations of their own.7 This caused the CPH to become better organised, unanimous and 
more effective.8 
 In 1935 the CPH changed its name to Communistische Partij van Nederland (CPN, 
Communist Party of the Netherlands) to focus on its national character (Nederland is 
considered to be more of a national entity than the internationalist Holland). Another 
important change took place in the party’s political agenda during this time. The period of 
isolation and aggression towards the social democrats and other parties of 1930-1934 was 
over and the party adopted the policy of popular fronts, which was designed at the Seventh 
Congress of the Comintern in 1935. These were broad coalitions of communists, social 
democrats, other left-wing parties and some moderately liberal (bourgeois) parties, against 
fascism. The popular fronts were occurring everywhere in Europe, but were especially 
successful in France and Spain. In the Netherlands the CPN also proposed cooperation to 
other groups, especially to the SDAP to which they offered to have a shared list of candidates 
for the elections of 1937. During this period the CPN also reconsidered its anti-social 
democratic, anti-national and anti-bourgeois democracy standpoints. Paul de Groot, for 
instance, said during the Party Congress of 1938 that the bourgeois democracy was ‘the best 
                                                          
6 http://www.politiekcompendium.nl/9351000/1f/j9vvh40co5zodus/vhrfr9bgsnya (accessed on 9 May 2015). 
7 P. Gregory, Restructuring the Soviet Union bureaucracy (Cambridge, 2009), p. 71. 
8 De Jonge, Communisme in Nederland, pp. 54-67. 
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form of government for the working class under capitalism.’9 But, the idea of the Popular 
Front became never as important in the Netherlands as in other countries because the social 
democrats and other groups (especially the Catholics) were afraid of cooperation with the 
communists. The disappointment of the rejection to cooperate, particularly by the social 
democrats, was an important domestic model factor in causing disillusionment about the 
social democrats in the CPN. This was already visible during this period, but would become 
much more prominent later on, which we will see in the third chapter.10 
 The CPN developed a very paradoxical stance at the start of World War II. During the 
period before, the party was very antifascist, but when a fascist aggressor (Nazi-Germany) 
actually attacked and World War II started in 1939, they could not take a hard stance against 
them. This was because the Soviet Union had signed the Treaty of Non-Aggression with the 
Germans earlier that year. The CPN’s solution to this problem was to condemn not only 
Germany, but to declare the war an imperial conflict, hereby condemning all “aggressors,” 
this echoed their standpoint during World War I. According to the CPN during these years, 
the Netherlands had to stay out of the conflict and the first objective of the party was not to 
liberate the nation, but the liberation of all workers. This caused new tensions between the 
CPN and the SDAP, who were in full support of the allied nations. Although they did not 
participate in any national resistance, aimed at liberation of the country, they still organised 
anti-fascist resistance. The German occupier therefore forbade the party in May 1940 after 
which it went on as an illegal party.11 It is very much clear that this intermezzo in the CPN’s 
antifascist coalition policy was caused by political choices of the Soviet Union, forced upon 
them, making a strong argument for the Moscow model. 
 
 
                                                          
9 De Jonge, Communisme in Nederland, p. 64. 
10 Verrips, Dwars, duivels en dromend, pp. 17-33. 
11 Ibid., pp. 59-74. 
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I.III Fighting the Nazis together 
In 1941, when the Soviet Union joined the allied forces, the CPN could openly attack the 
Nazis again and they joined the national resistance of World War II. This was a revival of the 
unified anti-fascist battle of before 1939. In a speech Paul De Groot said:  
 
It is not a question what politics will rule in the liberated Netherlands. (...) We have to 
find each other. National unity is needed. The goal is the liberation of our country. The 
class struggle has appeared in a different form. The line of demarcation is now for or 
against the occupiers. Party interests must be put aside in favour of the need for life that 
screams for unity.12 
 
There were a lot of communist people active in the Dutch resistance. Even though there was 
not really a central command, because the resistance was very locally based and led, a 
significant number of the local leaders were in fact communist. It is hard to give any exact 
numbers, because the resistance organizations did not keep any detailed administration for 
obvious reasons. However, based on the fact that among those persons executed by the 
German occupiers there was a significant number of communists and the fact that communist 
ideology radically opposed the fascist ideology of the Nazis and communism was one of the 
biggest enemies in Nazi ideology, it can be said that communists played an important role in 
the resistance against the Nazis. Also because the CPN was forbidden by the German 
occupier, all activities for the Party were by definition illegal and some kind of resistance.13  
 Despite the Communists often working alone in their resistance operations, they still 
had to coordinate the overall resistance with other groups in organizations, like the Raad van 
Verzet (Council of Resistance). In the Netherlands the resistance mainly took its resort to 
                                                          
12 Verrips, Dwars, duivels en dromend, p. 145. 
13 De Jonge, Het communisme in Nederland, pp. 77-92; L. de Jong, Het koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de 
Tweede Wereldoorlog, Deel 4 mei ’40-maart ’41 (tweede helft) (’s-Gravenhage, 1972), pp. 899-915. 
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printing illegal newspapers, going on strike, and creating an extensive network for hiding 
people. A lot of Jews, but also members of the resistance, men escaping draft or mandatory 
hard labour and other groups of people, were hidden from the German occupier and the Dutch 
police at addresses where they were not officially registered. At its peak moment the 
resistance’s network hid 350,000 people.14  
 The communists were especially active in the illegal press. Their party newspaper, De 
Waarheid (The Truth) was the most important resistance newspaper. They were also active in 
organizing strikes through their influential position in the labour unions. Especially the 
February strike of 1941 against the anti-Semitism of the German occupier was very effective. 
Lastly, a lot of the violent resistance was organised by Communists, since they were already 
used to a guerrilla-like battle during earlier years, although foreign communist groups were 
much more experienced in this respect. The fact that after 1941 communists and other groups, 
like the social democrats, worked together towards one goal (the liberation of the nation), was 
an important unifying force between them.15 
 During the war the CPN published brochures from which their wish to work together 
with other parties and their plans to keep doing this in the future became clear. Om Neêrlands 
Toekomst (‘About Netherlands’ future’), for instance, was a brochure from 1943 in which 
Protestants, Catholics, social democrats and communists wrote about the future of the 
Netherlands after the war. The introduction read: ‘especially after our experiences of the past 
the democratic principle is so widely endorsed, that we may, yes have, to take it as starting 
point for every examination of the future development of our country.’16 For the other parties 
it was not so shocking to endorse democracy, but for the CPN, who wanted to start a 
revolution and establish the socialist state without the help of the parliamentary democracy, it 
                                                          
14 C. Schulten, En verpletterd wordt het juk: verzet in Nederland, 1940-1945 (Den Haag, 1995). 
15 Verrips, Dwars, duivels en dromend, pp. 111-128. 
16 NIOD-IWHGS, Om Neêrlands Toekomst, 1943, p. 8.  
From: http://www.geheugenvannederland.nl/?/nl/items/NIOD02:047832835 (accessed on 16 May 2015). 
19 
 
really was. Jan Postma, a former Party Board-member and leader of the illegal CPN, wrote 
the communist part of the brochure.17 He still made a Marxist-Leninist analysis of Dutch 
society based on dialectical materialism and aimed at a socialist plan-economy, but in his text 
he also endorsed concepts like democracy, personal freedom and liberty of conscience for 
people of all religions. He also said that: ‘the Communist Party in the Netherlands has made 
great sacrifices in the battle against the Nazis. She fights this battle on the basis of national 
cooperation to re-establish the political proportions of before 10 May 1940.’18 The CPN also 
wanted the pre-war government to return as a transitional government on the way to new 
elections. So, the cooperation in the resistance had brought the CPN to make sacrifices for the 
political system of parliamentary democracy they had fought against for decades. 
 In another brochure, Hoe gaat het met de vakbeweging na de bevrijding? (‘How will it 
go with the labour movement after the liberation?’) from 1944, which was aimed at workers 
from all backgrounds and board members of the old labour unions, the CPN argued in favour 
of a unitary labour movement after the war. It focused on the experiences caused by the 
German occupier: ‘the German arrangements affected with equal severity Catholic, 
Protestant, social democrat and communist. They demolished more than everything the walls 
of partition, that had arisen between workers over time.’19 
 Lastly, their brochure Volksprogram voor een democratisch, vrij en welvarend 
Nederland (‘People’s Program for a Democratic, Free and Prosperous Netherlands’) from 
1944 was a guidebook with 51 points on how the CPN wanted the Netherlands to be lead after 
the war would end. It said: ‘it wants to be a program on the basis of which cooperation is 
possible between communists and other parts of the population, that are willing to fight for 
                                                          
17 http://socialhistory.org/bwsa/biografie/postma-j (accessed on: 16 May 2015). 
18 NIOD-IWHGS, Om Neêrlands Toekomst, p. 109. 
19 NIOD-IWHGS, Hoe gaat het met de vakbeweging na de bevrijding? (Uitgave van De Waarheid), 1944, p. 3. 
From: http://www.geheugenvannederland.nl/?/nl/items/NIOD02:186554206 (accessed on 18 May 2015). 
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the democracy and against the reaction.’20 The writers still hung unto some old points, like 
arguing the Dutch colony of Indonesia should be liberated, but they also made some 
concessions. For instance, they accepted the Royal House of the Netherlands and international 
cooperation with western countries. Also, the points were not hard demands, but negotiable 
propositions. It also said: ‘because all these points, in this People’s Program formulated, are 
not principally incompatible with the capitalist character of our society.’21 So, the Dutch 
Communists now even accepted the capitalist character of the Dutch society. 
 These three brochures show that during World War II  the CPN had already plans for 
cooperation with other parties after the war and that the most important thing in causing this 
was an experience that can be seen as part of the domestic model: the feeling of friendship 
and alliance and the sharing of the common goal of national liberation during the resistance 
years of World War II. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20 NIOD-IWHGS, Volksprogram voor een democratisch, vrij en welvarend Nederland (Uitgave van De 
Waarheid), Nov. 1944, p. 2.  
From: http://www.geheugenvannederland.nl/?/nl/items/NIOD02:066470641 (accessed on 16 May 2015). 
21 NIOD-IWHGS, Volksprogram, p. 2. 
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Chapter II:  
Cooperation to rebuild the country, 
1945-1948 
 
 
The peculiar fact about the liberation of the Netherlands during World War II was that it 
happened in different stages. The South of the Netherlands was liberated in the autumn of 
1944 already, but the rest of the Netherlands had to wait until May 1945. The result of this 
partial liberation for the CPN was that in the liberated South a Party Board-member of the 
illegal CPN, Wim van Exeter, re-established the party in legality as the CPN (Bevrijd Gebied) 
(CPN Liberated Area), while in the North the party remained illegal.1 The leaders of these two 
parties held different opinions about cooperation with social democrats and other parties and 
this would cause some conflict within the CPN during the first years after the war. In this 
chapter the two most important ideas about cooperation (a broad, popular union with all 
democratic parties and exclusive cooperation with social democrats) and the international 
situation at the time will be dealt with. 
 
II.I Disposing old politics 
The most important man in the CPN before the war was Paul de Groot. From 1930 onwards 
he had moved upwards in the hierarchy of the CPN until he had become General Secretary of 
the Party Board in 1938. However, when the German occupier arrested the leaders of the 
party, De Groot went into hiding. When in 1944 the South of the Netherlands was liberated, 
De Groot thought the North would follow soon. He ended his hiding and tried to regain his 
position in the northern, illegal CPN and he soon succeeded in this. The board of the illegal 
                                                          
1 De Jonge, Communisme in Nederland, pp. 82-86. 
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CPN forgave his cowardly stance and non-participation during the earlier years of the war and 
he became General Secretary of the Party Board again.2  
 One of the most important plans of De Groot after the war was a very curious one: he 
wanted to dissolve the CPN, because he did not believe in the pre-war political system 
anymore. On 4 May 1945 he said:  
 
The renewal of the political life demands none of the pre-war parties will be established 
again. For that purpose the establishment of a new party is to be wished, a Democratic 
Popular Party or Popular Union. This democratic Popular Party will have to be not an 
opposition party, but a governmental party.3 
 
It was not very clear on which ideology De Groot wanted to base the party, because he was 
never explicit about what role communism, social democracy and other ideologies had to play 
in the party. But it was clear to him that it should be a broad and open party, based on 
multiple ideas from different ideologies. In 1945 he wrote in the party magazine Scholing en 
Strijd (‘Schooling and Battle’): 
 
It’s about the unification of all democrats. (...) This goal cannot be accomplished if a 
new political formation would be designed on the basis of one world-view. This does 
not mean a lack of principles: we do not want to distance ourselves from our principles. 
(...) We want the friction because of the disputes over the principles not to be an 
obstacle for the formation of the democracy within an organization that is as big as 
possible.4 
 
                                                          
2 Verrips, Dwars, duivels en dromend, pp. 150-153. 
3 G. Harmsen, Daan Goulooze; uit het leven van een communist (Utrecht, 1967), p. 147. 
4 P. de Groot, ‘Over de vernieuwing van het politieke leven’, Scholing en Strijd, no.4 (June 1945): pp. 2-3 at pp. 
2-3. 
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At first, De Groot managed to convince the rest of the leadership of the northern CPN of the 
necessity of the liquidation of the party. Because De Waarheid had been one of the most 
popular resistance news papers, also amongst non-communists, De Groot proposed to 
establish what he called the Waarheidsbeweging (Waarheid-movement): broad coalitions of 
people from all party backgrounds, sympathetic to the workers’ cause, based on values like 
nationalism and democracy. To do this, the CPN wanted to focus on the middle class as new 
electorate. The directives of the illegal party leadership, who controlled the party nationally 
after the war, for the first post-war Congress in 1945 read: ‘these middle classes are the 
natural allies of the working class. (...) It is the duty of the labour movement, to gather these 
and other progressive movements from the middle classes around her, and form them to a 
democratic front, to fuse together everybody endangered and affected by the politics of the 
big business.’5 The CPN now started to reach out to what was traditionally the electorate of 
the social democrats: the (lower) middle class. With this De Groot tried to accomplish his 
goal of a broad, democratic popular party. 
 However, soon after the war De Groot and his plan were criticised by members of his 
own party. He could never convince the board of the re-established CPN in the South of his 
plans and even though they wanted to cooperate with other parties, the leaders of the southern 
CPN criticised De Groot very much for the concrete form of cooperation he proposed. At the 
Congress of 1945 De Groot’s leadership was not yet very well-established and some board 
members of the illegal, northern CPN joined their colleagues of the southern CPN to form the 
July-opposition against De Groot’s leadership, his role during the resistance and his plans 
with the party. In a document about the reestablishment of the CPN from 1945, to be 
discussed at the conference, the opposition wrote:  
                                                          
5 IISH-CPN, inv. nr. 781, Grondslagen voor de discussie: over de politieke toestand en de taken der partij in de 
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Politics, like they have been pursued since the liberation of the Netherlands and that 
presume that the socialist demands are not immediately important and ‘therefore’ the 
establishment of a socialist party is not important in the first place, must be discarded as 
opportunist politics. (...) This is the most striking in the conception of the so-called 
popular party with which one has left from completely wrong ideas about the character 
of the parties in a bourgeois society.6  
 
De Groot was directly attacked for his ideas in this document. The opposition criticised his 
approaches to other parties, especially his advances to the post-war Schermerhorn-Drees 
government, and it accused him of aiming for personal gain and power and a position in the 
government. That even the illegal board of the northern CPN not fully supported De Groot is 
reflected from the following quote from the directives for the 1945 Congress: 
 
We have forgotten that the existence of the Marxist-Leninist party is a condition for the 
establishment of a unitary party of the workers’ class and the unification of all the 
democratic forces. The Waarheids-movement is for the lasting and successful 
realization of these politics insufficient. The idea to accomplish the unification of all 
democratic groups together with the Waarheids-movement in the form of a party, a 
popular party, leads to a confusion of ideas. Here we cannot speak of a party. Instead we 
have to fight for a movement or union of democratic groups in which the workers’ class 
can have her own, independent party.7 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 IISH-CPN, inv. nr. 781, Discussiebijdrage over de heroprichting van de Communistische Partij, 1945, p. 2. 
7 IISH-CPN, inv. nr. 781, Grondslagen voor de discussie: over de politieke toestand en de taken der partij in de 
overgangsperiode van de oorlog naar de vrede (draft version), July 1945, p. 8. 
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II.II Unified party for the working class; an offer to the SDAP 
The other idea about cooperation at the time was that first cooperation with the social-
democrats should be established and only after this cooperation would be possible with other 
progressive and democratic parties. This idea originated in the southern CPN (Bevrijd 
Gebied), in the document about the reestablishment of the CPN they wrote: ‘this negation of 
independent party formation of the proletariat becomes most clear from the rejection of every 
policy of unification with the social democracy, even though there exists a unique opportunity 
to accomplish the unification of the workers’ movement.’8  
 After the war the CPN-board eventually adopted exclusive cooperation with social 
democrats over De Groot’s plan. In a letter from the CPN board to the SDAP board of 1 
September 1945 the communists offered far-going cooperation to the social democrats. The 
CPN said that the German occupier had encountered little opposition in conquering the 
Netherlands and had been fairly successful in establishing its rule there, because of the 
division that had existed within the Dutch workers’ class. Based on the friendships that had 
been established between communists and social democrats during the resistance years they 
now wanted far-going cooperation between the old CPN and old SDAP. They said: ‘we 
propose to you, comrades of the SDAP, to establish a friendly and remaining cooperation in 
the action for the next tasks, that have arisen for our people in these times.’9 And even: ‘but 
we do not want to halt there, we deem it our pressing duty to bring to your order the merger of 
both our parties to a big and strong workers’ party.’10 They proposed to establish commissions 
from both parties as soon as possible to execute a fusion. 
 However, the SDAP was not very positive about far-reaching cooperation with the 
CPN.  The illegal Party Board had already blamed the SDAP and other parties, who were 
only willing to cooperate with the CPN in some areas, but reluctant to make any fundamental, 
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9 IISH-CPN, 270, Brief van de CPN aan de SDAP, pp. 4-5. 
10 Ibid., p. 5. 
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long-term commitments, in the directives for Congress of 1945: ‘not only the SDAP refused 
to accomplish the unification of the workers’ class, also the other democratic organizations 
showed, not to be able to pursue a positive and fruitful unitarian political agenda, which was 
so much necessary for the resistance abilities of the Dutch people.’11 
 In their reply of 10 September 1945 to the letter of the CPN the SDAP board wrote: ‘in 
the mean time we can, also because of reasons of current politics, expect no prosperity from a 
cooperation, or possible fusion, with your party. (...) As long as this method is being practiced 
by you, it is not useful to speak about cooperation, let alone fusion.’12 The SDAP named in 
their letter three main reasons for their rejection: the CPN’s dependence on the Soviet Union, 
their anti-government standpoint and some parts of their ideology, mainly the dictatorship of 
the proletariat. 
 During the Party Congress of 1946, De Groot had fully accepted the idea of 
cooperation with the social democrats and he admitted that the July-opposition had been right 
in their wish to re-establish the CPN, but at the same time he condemned the isolative 
approach they had taken in doing so. De Groot had developed the opinion that the CPN 
should not be totally against the government Schermerhorn-Drees, but that they should 
support the progressive social democrats in it in order to create a crisis between the left-wing 
and reactionary elements in it. He said that therefore: ‘it is of such great importance that party 
members do not isolate themselves from the masses, but try to establish contacts with other 
groups.’13 He also said: ‘let us accomplish the breakthrough with a pact of social democrats 
and communists at the next elections. (...) A pact of social democrats and communists can 
form the core of a broad democratic union, on which after the elections a truly progressive 
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government can be built.’14 The Congress of 1946 was a partial defeat and victory for De 
Groot: he had to admit that he had been wrong and cooperation with social democrats was 
accepted as a core policy of the CPN, but De Groot himself remained the General Secretary of 
the CPN and he became the most important executor of the new policy. 
 Notwithstanding the reaction of the SDAP, Paul de Groot and the CPN still tried for 
some time to accomplish cooperation of communists and socialists. In 1947 they called in a 
manifest for: ‘cooperation of socialists and communists, for the preparation and execution of a 
truly democratic government, which is the guarantee for a progressive course, both 
domestically, as in Indonesia and with the foreign policy.’15 During this period the CPN was 
even prepared to be in the government: ‘she is prepared to participate in the government and 
partly carry the responsibility of governing the country.’16 This was a major step: the party 
that was ideological against parliamentary democracy and wanted to accomplish socialism 
trough a mass revolution, was now prepared to be in government to rebuild the country. 
 
II.III The international situation; a moment of opportunities 
During this cooperative period the CPN still wanted the Three Powers (Soviet Union, United 
States and Great Britain) to work together and keep the promises they made in Yalta and 
Potsdam. They really believed that a future conflict between the Soviet Union and the United 
States was not inevitable. As long as the three big powers could cooperate, this could still be 
prevented. They held onto this thought, even though most signs were pointing towards the 
opposite being true.17 
 And the CPN was certainly not the only communist party in Western Europe to take 
the cooperative approach described in this chapter. Many Western European countries were 
                                                          
14 IISH-CPN, 208, Congres-rede Paul de Groot, p. 26. 
15 IISH-CPN, inv. nr. 360, Manifest aan het werkende volk van Nederland: in den aanval tegen de reactie, 17 
Febr. 1947, p. 3. 
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heavily damaged by World War II and in most countries the communists were willing to 
participate in the reconstruction of the country. What also helped was that the Soviet Union 
took a more relaxed approach and propagated communist internationalism less than in 
previous periods, because they were burdened with the reconstruction of Eastern Europe. 
They now acknowledged that the Russian revolution was not the only way to reach socialism 
and they put the idea of a national road to communism forward. The Comintern had been 
abolished for this purpose in 1943 already.18 
 Historians have generally ignored this period of reconstruction and cooperation 
between communists and others. Classical and revisionist Cold War historians were too busy 
blaming either the Soviet Union or the United States for starting the Cold War and they saw 
the first steps towards that conflict taken directly after World War II and also the post-
revisionist historians, although they were more nuanced about the causes of the Cold War, 
still saw the conflict starting directly after the war. Only recently historians have begun to 
appreciate the period between the end of World War II and the start of the Cold War as a 
historical period of its own and not an intermediate stage of World War II leading 
teleologically into to the Cold War. These historians saw multiple possibilities during this 
period and acknowledged that the Cold War was only the possibility that became reality, but 
there was no period of inevitable evolution and escalation.19 This thesis contributes to this 
historical trend as well, in the sense that it shows that the CPN saw several opportunities for 
cooperation during this period and actively contributed to reconstruct the Netherlands. The 
Cold War only became an inevitable reality for them several years after the end of World War 
II. 
 
                                                          
18 S. Pons, ‘Stalin and the European Communists after World War Two (1943-1948)’, Past & Present, 210 
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19 M. Mazower, ‘Reconstruction: the historiographical issues’, Past & Present, 210 (Supplement 6) (2011): pp. 
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Chapter III: 
Resentment over rejection and isolation, 
1948-1950 
 
 
In this chapter the issues which were most important in the CPN’s distancing from the SDAP 
and the consequent isolation of the party will be dealt with. Consecutively, the effect of the 
SDAP accomplishing a breakthrough without the CPN, the transformation of the SDAP and 
the parties’ conflicts over the Marshall Plan and Dutch colonialism and Indonesia will be 
treated. There were other issues, but the primary sources from the CPN-archive have shown 
these were the most important and this is confirmed in the secondary literature. 
 
III.I The PVDA, a breakthrough without the Communists 
The CPN had called for a breakthrough of communists and social democrats in 1946 (p. 26), 
but the SDAP accomplished this breakthrough with other parties. The idea of a breakthrough 
had been well-established within the SDAP before and grown during World War II. The idea 
was that progressive politicians from all backgrounds (social democrat, Catholic, Protestant 
and liberal) would form one big party to fight against conservatism. Traditionally this was 
hard to accomplish in the verzuilde (pillarised) Dutch society, where the different political and 
religious groups lived relatively separated lives. They had their own political parties, news-
papers, broadcasting organizations, labour unions, employer organizations, schools, hospitals, 
shops and sport clubs. There were four pillars: social democrats, Catholics, Protestants and 
generals or liberals. Dutch communists sometimes participated in the organizations of the 
general or liberal pillar and sometimes participated in their own organizations outside the 
traditional system.1 But after the experiences of World War II there was much more 
willingness to cooperate with each other. After the war the people who were willing to do so 
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established the NVB (Nederlandse Volksbeweging, Dutch Popular Movement), which had to 
concretise the ideas which had arisen during the war in order to create a new, more broadly 
supported, progressive party.2 
 The letter from the CPN of 1 September 1945 must be seen as an ultimate attempt to 
reach out to the SDAP, to convince them to cooperate with them instead of cooperating with 
the NVB and the parties from the Schermerhorn-Drees government. But, the leaders of the 
SDAP had already made up their mind: they were more closely connected to the progressive 
politicians from the Schermerhorn-Drees government, especially those from the VDB 
(Vrijzinnig Democratische Bond, Liberal Democratic Union), a liberal party. Eventually, with 
the help of the NVB, the PVDA was established on 9 February 1946. The SDAP, VDB and a 
progressive Christian democratic party fused together to form a new and stronger progressive 
party.3 
 The rejection of the SDAP to cooperate with them and their cooperation with parties 
on the other side of the political spectrum caused lot of resentment within the CPN. It came as 
a heavy blow to the communists, because they thought the war-time experiences and the 
resistance friendships and cooperation meant a lot. By supporting the pre-war government, 
embracing values like democracy and nationalism they thought they would become at least 
part of the formation of a new government. But this was not the case, there was no place for 
the CPN in the Schermerhorn-Drees government and the coalition of social democrats and 
Catholics persevered until 1958. The CPN rejected the PVDA’s new interpretation of social 
democracy. In the Party Board meeting of 28 September 1946 the CPN approved of a motion 
which read: ‘let us first of all establish, what social democracy actually is. She is nothing 
other, than the reflection of the politics of the capitalism in the workers’ movement. Without a 
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doubt the PVDA is in this aspect even worse than all the other social democratic parties.’4 
Also, the CPN saw the PVDA as the most important reactionary force in the Dutch 
government, selling out the Dutch working class to the Anglo-American, imperialist big 
business. In a letter to their members of 26 July 1948 the CPN board wrote: ‘the PVDA has 
(...) in the last couple of years become the most important auxiliary of the United States and 
the ultimate hair-splitter against communism.’5 During the Party Board meeting of 20 July 
1948 the CPN definitively killed of all possibilities for cooperation with the PVDA in a 
resolution: 
 
During World War II our party sought cooperation with all enemies of Hitler-Germany 
and Japan and during the last period of the occupation contact had been established 
between illegal groups, which orientated themselves on London on the basis of a 
compromise of the social democracy and ‘leftist bourgeois elements.’ Because of this 
illusions regarding a peaceful development and cooperation after the war have been 
raised within the party. Towards the end of the occupation a big change occurred. With 
the protection of British troops the reaction came back to power under the 
Schermerhorn government and she started her attack against the workers’ class and the 
progressive powers of the country. Our party has, in accordance with the changes in 
these circumstances, which where the consequence of the breaching of the treaties of 
Yalta and Potsdam by the Anglo-American imperialists, established her political 
course.6 
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The influence of the reaction to cooperation with the CPN in the SDAP on the CPN’s policy 
is a factor from the domestic model. But in this last quote it becomes clear that the CPN itself 
attributed this change in the SDAP’s political agenda to the interference of American 
imperialists, with the help of Great Britain, and big business trusts in European (and thus 
Dutch) politics. Here we can see how a factor from the Washington model influenced the 
domestic model and this is a good example of how all the models are in fact intertwined, 
something which Boxhoorn does not recognize. Even though we have to bear in mind that the 
CPN blamed the U.S. for their isolation to justify their own position and actions. 
 An important long-time transformation within the SDAP had been going on, laying the 
basis for the breakthrough with other parties. The party had evolved from a more socialist 
party in the opposition in its early days to a social-democratic party, which was prepared to 
take the responsibility of being in government and making concessions in order to achieve 
things from their own political agenda, after the war. Because the CPN remained a hard-line 
opposition party, the two parties had been growing away from each other ideologically. 
During a Party Board meeting in 1949 Jan Schalker said: ‘during the last year and a half we 
have put the Marshall-plan, of which the consequences for our country are well-known, and 
the battle against the colonial politics of the Dutch government, central in our propaganda.’7 
These were the two ideological points of conflict between the CPN and the PVDA and 
therefore these will be treated in the following paragraphs. 
 
III.II The social democrats’ changed opinion on Indonesia 
The Dutch had controlled Indonesia since the 17th century, since the 19th century it was a 
colony, called the Dutch East Indies. During World War II the country was occupied by 
Japan. During the war a national movement had emerged to liberate the country and after the 
                                                          
7 IISH-CPN, inv. nr. 278, Notulen van het Partij Bestuur, 29 & 30 Jan. 1949, p. 1. 
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war, they declared themselves independent as the Republic of Indonesia under President 
Sukarno. The Dutch, however, were not willing to let go of their colony and started military 
actions, called politionele acties (police actions), against the Republic of Indonesia. These 
military actions escalated into a de facto colonial war.8 
 The SDAP had been against the Dutch possession of Indonesia until after World War 
II and they had supported the Indonesian call for independence. But they changed their 
opinion after they became a member of the Schermerhorn-Drees government. Here they made 
a huge concession to the RKSP, which had always been in favour of some sort of Dutch 
colonial possession of Indonesia. The compromise of the Schermerhorn-Drees government 
was that they wanted to give some sort of autonomy to Indonesia, but on the other hand still 
keep some kind of influence over them and guide their revolution. For this purpose they had 
invented the Netherlands-Indonesian Union, a confederation based on the British 
Commonwealth.9 
 The CPN had always been against colonialism and imperialism and thus against the 
Dutch possession of Indonesia and they maintained this opinion, after the war. They were the 
only political party to consistently keep this opinion. In doing so, they became the major 
criticizer of Indonesia as a colony, as well as of the new plan of a federal union.10 
 This caused major tension between the CPN and the PVDA and the CPN heavily 
criticised the PVDA for their opportunism and the fact that they sold out their stand-point to 
the Catholics to gain governmental power. In May 1948 Fred Schoonenberg, a member of the 
CPN and a journalist, wrote an article about the CPN and Indonesia in Politiek en Cultuur, a 
                                                          
8 A. Reid, Indonesian national revolution, 1945-1950 (Upper Saddle River, 1975). 
9 M. Bogaarts, Parlementaire Geschiedenis van Nederland na 1945, deel II: De periode van het kabinet Beel, 3 
juli 1946-7 augustus 1948, Band D, eerste helft, b Nederlands-Indië (Nijmegen, 1995), 3451. 
10 A. Schouten, Principes verloren, opportunisme geboren: de houding van de PVDA en de CPN in het publieke 
domein ten opzichte van de Indonesische revolutie 1945-1950 (Groningen, 2008), pp. 79-81; De Jonge, Het 
communisme in Nederland, pp. 90-91. 
34 
 
magazine published monthly by the CPN about the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism, 
dealing with all kinds of issues in the Dutch society. Schoonenberg wrote: 
 
The disgusting betrayal of the leaders of the PVDA of the principles of the socialist 
workers’ movement, concerning the right of every people to independence and to set 
straight their own society to their own wishes, without any alien or foreign intervention, 
becomes more clear, as the development of the events surrounding the Dutch-
Indonesian relations are being recalled in memory more clearly.11 
 
III.III America comes into the mix; conflict over the Marshall Plan 
Because the Netherlands was not important enough and because the communists never 
accomplished enough power to form a real force, America never directly intervened in Dutch 
politics. However, the Marshall Plan formed one of the biggest points of conflict between the 
CPN and the SDAP and that was designed by the Americans. 
 During the Party Congress of 1946 the Party Board of the CPN said: ‘the America of 
Truman and Marshall wants to seize world domination through its monetary power, the 
temporary lead of its production capacity, corruption, political reaction and military 
violence.’12 About the Marshall Plan they said: ‘it is in the first place a plan to help America, 
at the cost of the emaciation of the countries that accept the American guardianship.’13 The 
Marshall Plan and the American intentions for it is one of the most heavily debated subjects 
from the Cold War. Orthodox historians, supporting the Moscow model, saw it as a plan to 
save the world, designed by the Americans out of altruism and without a hidden agenda.14 
                                                          
11 F. Schoonenberg, ‘Moesoeh of temen – vriend of vijand’, Politiek en Cultuur, 3, no. 5 (May 1948): pp. 157-
161 at p. 158. 
12 IISH-CPN, inv. nr. 208, Verslag van het Partij Bestuur voor het Congres, January 1946, p. 2 
13 IISH-CPN, 208, Verslag, 1946, pp. 3-4. 
14 G. Behrman, The most notable adventure: the Marshall Plan and the time when America helped save Europe 
(New York , 2007). 
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Revisionist historians, supporting the Washington model, saw it as a political plan to 
incorporate Western-Europe in the western bloc, hereby antagonizing the Soviet Union and 
dividing the European continent.15 
 The CPN adhered to this last interpretation and they made use of a lot of its key 
arguments. They saw the Marshall Plan as an attempt to hold off an economic crisis in 
America itself and on the Party Conference of 1946 De Groot called the Marshall Plan 
‘established for political purposes’ and ‘the economic component of the Truman Doctrine.’ 
He also appealed for the establishment of an anti-Marshall Plan manifest.16 Criticism was also 
uttered in the Dutch Parliament in 1948 when Jan Schalker said about a treaty for European 
cooperation connected with the Marshall Plan: ‘this treaty after all is one of the many 
conditions for the Marshall Plan. This treaty did not emerge because of the initiative of one of 
the countries involved, but because of pressure from America, because the Americans were 
not willing to carry out the Marshall Plan without this treaty.’17 
 De Groot was partly right; one of the reasons for the Americans to establish the 
Marshall Plan was to defend its own economy. However, post-revisionist historians have 
shown that this was not the only, or even the most important reason: both political arguments 
and genuine humanitarian arguments played a role with the establishment of the plan. The 
Marshall Plan had to rebuild the Western European economies in order to reinforce the 
American economy and in the end make the entire world stronger. Also, the Soviet Union and 
other communist countries in Eastern Europe were designed to be part of the plan, and only 
after their refusal they were excluded.18 
 Because the Marshall Plan was distributed throughout Western Europe, the CPN was 
cooperating with Western European Communist Parties in deciding their policy on the 
                                                          
15 A. Milward, The reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51 (London, 1984). 
16 IISH-CPN, inv. nr. 252, Partij Conferentie 1946: rede Paul de Groot, 23 Nov. 1946, p. 2. 
17 Handelingen Eerste Kamer 1947-1948, 22 July 1948, p. 727. 
18 G. Lundestad, ‘Empire by invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952’, Journal of Peace 
Research, 23, no.3 (1986): pp. 263-277. 
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Marshall Plan. In a statement from 24 April 1948 the Communist Parties of the Netherlands, 
France, Great Britain, Belgium and Luxemburg spoke out against the Marshall Plan 
collectively.19 The CPN’s archive minutes show that members of the board also went to 
meetings with other Communist Parties in Western Europe and delegations were sent to 
events organised by Communist Parties abroad. This resulted in influences of other 
Communist Parties in Western Europe on the CPN. These influences were independent from 
the influences from the Washington model and the Moscow model. This is a major flaw in 
Boxhoorn’s tripartite schedule of explaining the attitude of Communist Parties: he ignores the 
fact that the Communist Parties in Western Europe also had an influence on each other, an 
influence which had little to do with the Soviet Union and the United States. 
 It is also important to note that the criticism of social democracy that has been 
portrayed in this chapter gradually developed and intensified over time. At first the CPN only 
became against the PVDA as a party and they still supported the left-wing opposition within 
the PVDA. They still to welcomed social democrats in their party and to work together with 
them in other organizations. In 1949 still, the CPN assigned a board member with the specific 
tasks of recruiting new members amongst the PVDA followers.20 But in 1950 they distanced 
themselves from the leftist opposition in the PVDA and all social democrats in general in a 
party resolution.21 The period in which they tried to incorporate social democrats in their party 
was over and the Cold War had escalated so far by then that cooperation between communists 
and social democrats was unthinkable for decades. 
 
                                                          
19 IISH-CPN, inv. nr. 361, Verklaring van de communistische partij van Frankrijk, Groot-Brittannië, België, 
Nederland en Luxemburg, 24 Apr. 1948. p. 1; ‘Voor vrede en veiligheid: verklaring van de communistische 
partijen van Frankrijk, Groot-Brittannië, België, Nederland en Luxemburg’, De Waarheid, 25 Apr. 1948, p. 5. 
20 IISH-CPN, inv. nr. 389, Notulen vergadering Partij Secretariaat, 16 Apr. 1949, p. 1. 
21 IISH-CPN, inv. nr. 279, De resolutie van het P.B. en het “linkse” socialisme, 31 Mar. 1950, p. 1. 
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Chapter 4 The Eenheidsvakcentrale, 
a comparative case study 
 
 
So far the main argument of this thesis has explained why the leaders of the CPN changed 
their opinion on cooperation with social democrats. In this chapter a comparative case study 
will be given to show how another group of Dutch Communists thought about the subject. 
The choice has been made to deal with the leaders of the EVC, because of the importance of 
the labour unions in the CPN’s attitude towards the social democrats. One of the most 
important goals of the communists was to improve the situation of the working class. The 
theoretical and political calculations made by the CPN had to be addressed in practice every 
day on the work floor by the EVC and communist workers, where they worked alongside 
non-communists on a day-to-day basis and the question whether to work together with them 
was a question that was very much relevant every day. Also, the CPN’s attitude towards 
labour unions characterised their attitude towards social democrats in general. In this chapter 
first an analytical narrative will be given of the history of labour unions in the Netherlands 
before World War II, the relationship of the CPN with these and the eventual establishment of 
the EVC, then the fusion plans for the EVC and the social democratic labour union, NVV 
(Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen, Dutch Alliance of Labour Unions), will be 
analyzed and lastly the criticism of this fusion, the eventual failure of the project and the 
reasons for these will be treated. 
 
IV.I Labour unions in the Netherlands before World War II and the establishment of 
the EVC 
The NAS (Nationaal Arbeids-Secretariaat, National Labour Secretariat), which was 
established in 1893 through the Second International and which was at first connected to the 
SDAP, was the first labour union of the Netherlands. But soon they became too radical, when 
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headed towards the idea of anarcho-syndicalism, or revolutionary syndicalism, which is the 
idea that aims at violently abolishing the state government in a revolution and replacing it 
with labour unions at the head of the different industrial sectors, where workers can manage 
and govern themselves.1 The SDAP broke all ties with them and in 1906 they established the 
more moderate and social democratic NVV.2 
 In the policy of the CPN towards the labour unions the same periods of more and less 
cooperation with the social democrats as in the first chapter become visible. Until 1935 they 
had a radical labour union policy, aimed at supporting the NAS, which was during that period 
also a member of the international and communist Rode Vakbondsinternationale (RVI, Red 
Labour Union’s International). The CPN supported the strikes organised by them and they 
published a magazine, Klassenstrijd (Class Conflict), together. During the years of the 
popular fronts (1935-1939) they supported both the NAS and the NVV and they tried to 
accomplish a fusion between the two labour unions. During this period they also supported 
less radical forms of protest, like deliberating with employers’ organizations and the 
government.3 
 During the war the NAS was forbidden right away, but the NVV first cooperated with 
the Germans until they forbade the NVV as well and created their own labour union in 1942. 
During the war the CPN did not support any of the labour unions anymore, instead they 
started to organize their own strikes amongst communist workers as a means of resistance. 
When the South was liberated in 1944 the Communist Party created the EVC there. The most 
important underlying principle, as exemplified by its name, was that the EVC had to be a 
labour union that incorporated workers from all backgrounds. It especially aimed to 
incorporate old members of the NVV who did not want to go back to that union because of its 
                                                          
1 R. Rocker, Anarcho-syndicalism: theory and practice (London, 1989), pp. 49-62. 
2 De Jonge, Het communisme in Nederland, pp. 24-33. 
3 Cussell, Over de eenheid van links, pp. 1-25. 
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contaminated wartime history.4 To set out the goal of the EVC and attract new members, 
Berend Blokzijl, a CPN-board member and president of the EVC, wrote in Scholing en Strijd 
in 1945 that: 
 
In the battle against the common enemy, we have to preserve the unity, that has grown 
in the war, in a labour union that comprises all workers of hand and head. A condition 
for reaching this goal is that the new labour union has to be independent from political 
parties and that she on the same time is not an extension of any religious objective.5 
 
IV.II Unified labour union for the working class; an offer to the NVV 
After the war the NVV became popular again and a lot of the old members returned. The 
EVC and NVV both became a member of the Wereldvakverbond (World Trade Union) and 
plans were made in June 1945 for the fusion of the EVC and the NVV. The success of strikes 
and other labour union activities, organised with workers of other backgrounds and the feeling 
that unification of the workers’ class was important to stand up against the their bosses led to 
negotiations between the two organizations directly after the war.6 In June 1945 a policy 
programme was published by both labour unions in which their intention for the fusion was 
published for the first time. The new labour union was to be called Algemeen Nederlands 
Verbond van Bedrijfsbonden (ANVB, General Dutch Union of Labour Unions) and it was to 
be established on a politically neutral basis, organised along company lines. The ANVB 
would be an umbrella organization incorporating already existing labour unions from all 
companies, industries and backgrounds. Labour unions could apply for membership of the 
ANVB, which then would look after the interests of all the affiliated labour unions 
collectively. The policy programme read: ‘our country, as small nation in the rows of people, 
                                                          
4 Coomans, De Eenheidsvakcentrale, pp. 19-36. 
5 B. Blokzijl, ‘De nieuwe vakbeweging’, Scholing en Strijd, no.4 (June 1945): p. 8 at p.8. 
6 Coomans, De Eenheidsvakcentrale, pp. 127-162. 
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has made a wonderful contribution [to the liberation of the country] trough its unity, we shall 
not lose this unity under any circumstance.’7 In some organs of the new labour union both 
employers and their organizations and workers and their organizations would be incorporated 
as a platform to negotiate.  
 In April 1946, after almost a year of further negotiation, a fusion report was published 
by the two organizations. It was designed by the boards of both labour unions and put up to be 
voted on by conferences of both organisations. It read: ‘these unions must be prepared to 
accept every worker, from whatever religion or political conviction he or she may be, who 
fulfils the criteria and accepts the goal and the principles of the Union.’8 How the new labour 
union would work is best described by the following article: 
 
The boards of the NVV and the EVC declare that the ANVB will pursue the realization 
of its goals trough deliberation. Only when this deliberation does not lead to reasonable 
results, will, with full consideration of the general well-being, the democratic rule of 
law and the particularly difficult circumstances, with which our country is dealing at the 
moment, be turned to giving up work [i.e. striking].9  
 
So, the ANVB would be a centrally organised and quite moderate labour union. Here the EVC 
made a huge concession to the NVV, since the EVC had always been more radical and they 
took their resort to going on a strike way more often than the NVV, which was more aimed at 
deliberation and used the strike only as ultimate means. And the EVC made more 
concessions: the entire fusion was aimed at the idea of incorporating the smaller EVC into the 
organizational structure of the bigger NVV. Therefore, a lot of the high positions in the 
                                                          
7 IISH-CPN, inv. nr. 361, Beginselverklaring en program van actie voor de eenheidsvakbeweging, June 1945, p. 
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8 IISH-CPN, inv. nr. 361, Fusie-rapport, opgesteld door delegaties van de landelijke besturen van het NVV en de 
EVC, Apr. 1946, p. 1. 
9 IISH-CPN, 361, Fusie-rapport, p. 3. 
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ANVB would be distributed based on the size of the two old organizations and here again the 
NVV was in advantage over the EVC. 
 
IV.III Criticism, rejection and failure of the fusion 
Right away the negotiations about the terms for the fusion encountered difficulties. In 
December 1945 already the discussions were suspended for the first time, because the NVV 
accused the EVC of breaking the pledge of secrecy.10 And exactly because the EVC made 
quite a few concessions to the NVV, there was a group criticizing the fusion within the EVC. 
Several union members established what they called the ‘action committee’ trying to fight the 
fusion from within the EVC in August 1946. On the Congress where union members voted on 
the fusion report 45,000 had voted against and 76,000 in favour of the terms.11 Now, the most 
fanatic no-voters organised themselves because they were looking to increase their support. 
The committee wrote letters to all the EVC-members they deemed trustworthy enough to 
cooperate with them, or at least not inform the leadership of the labour union about their 
initiative. In this letter they spoke out against the fusion and especially against the favourable 
terms for the NVV, they also asked the members to join the opposition and give a list of 
names of other party-members who might also be willing to do so.12 
 The committee send out sixty letters, since they only addressed members they already 
deemed trust-worthy and sympathetic to their cause and they got 32 replies in first instance. 
Most of the replies were at least to some extent positive towards the committee’s cause. 
Almost all respondents agreed with the committee that there were things wrong with the 
fusion and the terms for it, but some thought the approach of the committee was wrong. They 
thought there should not be a secret opposition within the EVC, which could result in a split-
                                                          
10 ‘Schorsing Fusiebesprekingen N.V.V.-E.V.C.: de achtergrond van het conflict’, Werkend Nederland. Orgaan 
van de Eenheidsvakcentrale, 17 Dec. 1945, pp. 1-2. 
11 Coomans, De Eenheidsvakcentrale, p. 161. 
12 IISH-CPN, inv. nr. 1280, Circulaire van het initiatiefcomité aan de leden van de EVC, August 1946. 
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off, but instead they wanted an open criticism, first within the EVC and later, if necessary, in 
the new fusion union.13 But, most of the respondents agreed with the committee and their 
approach and they also sent lists of names of other members possibly being against the fusion 
and its terms.14  
 Because of these positive reactions the action committee organised a congress, 
attended by many of the respondents, in Amsterdam on 24 and 25 August 1946. The 
committee’s support had grew massively in the weeks after and in a manifest, send to all 
EVC-members and signed by 71 functionaries of the union, the committee spoke about their 
fear that the EVC-leadership would force the fusion unto the union and ignore the opposition 
and the democratic principles that lay at the organization’s basis. They criticised the 
conditions laid out in the fusion report, accused the leadership of the union of dismissing 
members of the board who were against the fusion and said: ‘danger is here. (...) Our battling 
unity, born from the misery and grief that capitalism has brought us and steeled and cleansed 
in the heavy sacrificing battle, is being threatened with extinction. (...) this fusion-report 
cannot withstand the test of criticism: it is a liquidation-report.’15 Eventually the opposition 
was helped in its goal to prevent the fusion by the changed opinion towards it within the 
NVV. They aborted the plan to merge with the EVC and definitively pulled the plug from the 
ANVB-project in 1948. Right after the war a fusion was attractive for the NVV, since the 
EVC was a big labour union and they had a lot of potential, also the NVV itself was 
discredited because of its wartime activities. However, in 1948 the EVC had not lived up to 
its potential and the NVV would not benefit so much from a fusion anymore, so they ended 
the project.16 
                                                          
13 IISH-CPN, inv. nr. 1280, Antwoord van B.A. Roschar, August 1946. 
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 The CPN was a big proponent of the fusion. Chief editor Joop van Tijn wrote In 
Politiek en Cultuur in 1947 that the action committee was an insurgency, which was incited 
by reactionary, outside forces and he explicitly accused the leaders of the PVDA of this. He 
also said: ‘despite all the inciting, despite all the agitating, the unity will prevail. The fusion 
between the NVV and EVC, much feared by the enemies of the workers’ class, ends the 
period of discord and starts the triumphing period of the unity.’17 The CPN also tried to exert 
their influence on the EVC through board members of the labour union who were also 
member of the CPN. Lastly, they also supported the fusion in their news media and on party 
activities like congresses and conferences.18 
 The periods of more and less cooperation with social democrats and the timing of the 
transformation in the attitude towards this was similar within the EVC and the CPN. 
However, the nature of the criticism was different. Within the CPN the criticism was first 
aimed at the party leadership of the SDAP and PVDA, and later also on social democracy and 
social democrats in general. With the EVC, however, the criticism was specifically aimed at 
the fusion and the terms for it, but they never criticised social democracy or social democrats 
as such. They criticised the NVV, but did not see this as a symbol of social democracy. The 
most important cause for the change was comparable to what we have seen with the CPN: the 
difficulties caused by the non-cooperative stance of the NVV and their eventual rejection, 
which is a cause from the domestic model. What this case study shows is that the changing 
attitude about cooperation with social democrats was something that not only took place 
within the CPN, but in other communist organizations as well. In both organizations the same 
causes, problems, possibilities and considerations played a role. 
 
 
                                                          
17 J. van Tijn, ‘Om de eenheid van de Nederlandse vakbeweging’, Politiek en Cultuur, 2, no.1 (January 1947): 
pp. 12-15 at p. 12. 
18 Coomans, De Eenheidsvakcentrale, pp. 230-258.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
The relationship between the CPN and the social democrats was subject to many changes 
before World War II. During the first years of the CPN it was mainly decided by how the 
party itself thought about how it could make the biggest electoral gains. From the 1930’s 
onwards the Soviet Union and the Comintern also had a significant influence on it. During 
World War II, the CPN cooperated with social democrats in the resistance against the Nazis 
and after the war the CPN wanted to continue this relationship to rebuild the country together. 
This resulted first in the plan to liquidate the CPN and create a broad, democratic movement 
with all progressive parties and later in a proposal to the SDAP to work together exclusively. 
The most important influence shaping this attitude was domestic: the cooperative mind-set, 
created by the shared experience and common goals during the resistance, was continued after 
the war. The relaxed role of the Soviet Union, permitting a national road to socialism, played 
a role too. This attitude was widely visible with other communist parties in Western Europe; 
internationally there were many possibilities for cooperation and the CPN was reinforced in 
its support for cooperation by the successes of cooperation between communists and social 
democrats abroad. 
 By 1948 this cooperative attitude began to disappear. The CPN openly attacked the 
PVDA and the governments they were in. The social democrats had evolved from a socialist 
party in opposition to a social-democratic party making concessions in the government and 
because the CPN remained a hard-line opposition party, the parties grew apart ideologically. 
This was most clearly visible in their opinions on the Dutch colony of Indonesia. The 
communists felt much resentment as a result of this rejection and this was the most important 
cause of their eventual isolation. Also, Soviet pressure (the Moscow model) played a role, as 
reflected by the Soviet Union taking back some of the control they had let go after the war. 
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American pressure (the Washington model) played a less important role: the Dutch case was 
not important enough for the Americans to directly meddle with it. They did have some 
indirect influence: the Marshall Plan, initiated by the American government, became another 
important points of conflict between the CPN and the PVDA. The domestic model from 
Boxhoorn’s theory, which formed the theoretical background of this thesis, best explains this 
change of attitude, because the most important factor was the negative attitude towards and 
eventual rejection of the idea of cooperation by the social democrats. 
 During this period a comparable change in attitude occurred within the communist 
labour union, EVC. Right after the war they wanted to merge with the NVV, the social 
democratic labour union. But after a period of negotiation over the terms of this fusion, the 
NVV eventually rejected this idea, after this the EVC criticised the NVV. The periodization 
of this transformation is the same as that of the CPN, however their criticism differed. The 
EVC only criticised the NVV and their policies, whereas the CPN not only criticised the 
PVDA, but also social democracy and social democrats in general, the EVC never did this. 
The reasons for the change of opinion within the EVC were comparable to the case of the 
CPN: again domestic political factors (the domestic model) were the most important. The 
criticism within the EVC of the fusion and the eventual rejection by the NVV were the most 
important reasons for the changed attitude of the EVC. 
 Two major critiques of Boxhoorn’s model have been developed in this thesis. Firstly, 
Boxhoorn sees things as being static and he ignores the influences the models have on each 
other. Each of the causes for the CPN’s changed attitude cannot be exclusively put into one 
model, they always arose through the interaction of policies from Moscow, Washington and 
the Netherlands. The other major criticism is that a fourth model can be added to Boxhoorn’s 
tripartite distinction: the CPN’s attitude was also formed by the influence of other Western 
European communist parties. There was much contact between the CPN and other Western 
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European Communist Parties, they coordinated their criticism of the Marshall Plan, they 
issued a collective statement against it and after the war the CPN conferred with other 
Western European parties about whether or not to re-establish the party again. This influence 
of the Western European Communist Parties on the CPN’s attitude towards social democrats 
was separate from the influences of the Soviet Union and the United States and is therefore a 
fourth model. 
 An important phenomenon this thesis has shown is that there was a period of genuine 
cooperation and reconstruction between the end of World War II and the start of the Cold 
War. This period must be seen as a challenging time during which different ideas about how 
the world should be shaped were competing with each other. That the world was eventually 
divided by a socialist and a capitalist bloc with the resulting Cold War does not disprove the 
fact that there were many more possibilities during the period right after World War II. 
Peaceful coexistence, an idea which would only be reinvented years later by Nikita 
Khrushchev, was during this period an alternative that was just as plausible. Thus, the story of 
the Dutch communists has shown that there never was a slippery slope from World War II 
into the Cold War. 
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Appendix I 
Original Quotations 
 
 
Page 4, Note 1: 
‘Sinds 1909, bijna vijf en dertig jaren lang, is de arbeidspartij in ons land verdeeld geweest. 
Maar al te lang heeft de strijd tussen sociaal-democraten en communisten gewoed. Het is tijd 
om de verdeeldheid te begraven. (...) Daartoe moet er een machtige eensgezinde 
arbeiderspartij geschapen worden, op den grondslag van het wetenschappelijk socialisme, 
uitgerust met de rijpe ervaringen van een halve eeuw Nederlandse arbeidersstrijd.’ 
 
Page 4, Note 2: 
‘In de achter ons liggende periode hebben wij de sociaal-democratie eenheid aangeboden, en 
ook gedeeltelijk met haar samengewerkt. Nu moeten we een front tegen haar maken. Zonder 
de hulp van de sociaal-democratie zou ons eigen reactie geen koloniale oorlog kunnen voeren 
en zou de reactie internationaal geen oorlog tegen de Sovjet-Unie kunnen voorbereiden. (…) 
Wij kunnen onder deze omstandigheden niets anders dan stelling nemen tegen de PVDA.’ 
 
Page 16, Note 9: 
‘De beste staatsvorm voor de arbeidersklasse onder het kapitalisme.’ 
 
Page 17, Note 12:  
‘Het is niet de vraag welke politiek in het bevrijde Nederland zal heersen. (...) We moeten 
elkaar vinden. Nodig is nationale eenheid. Doel is bevrijding van het land. De klassestrijd 
heeft andere vormen aangenomen. De scheidslijn is thans voor of tegen de bezetters. 
Partijbelangen moeten terzijde worden gezet ten gunste van de levensbelangen die 
schreeuwen om eenheid.’ 
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Page 18, Note 16: 
‘Vooral na onze ervaringen der afgelopen jaren wordt de waarde van het democratisch 
beginsel zoo breed erkend dat wij het mogen, ja moeten nemen als uitgangspunt voor elke 
beschouwing van de toekomst van ons land.’ 
 
Page 19, Note 18: 
‘De communistische partij in Nederland (C.P.N.) heeft in den strijd tegen de Nazi’s groote 
offers gebracht. Zij voert dezen strijd op de basis van nationale samenwerking tot herstel van 
de staatkundige verghoudingen van voor 10 Mei 1940.’ 
 
Page 19, Note 19:  
‘De Duitse maatregelen troffen in gelijke hardheid katholiek, protestant, sociaal-democraat en 
communist. Zij slechtten meer dan iets anders de scheidsmuren, die in de loop der tijden 
tussen de arbeiders waren ontstaan.’ 
 
Pages 19-20, Note 20: 
‘Het wil een program zijn waarop samenwerking mogelijk is tussen communisten en andere 
delen der bevolking, die bereid zijn strijd te voeren voor de democratie en tegen de reactie.’  
 
Page 20, Noot 21: 
‘De eisen, in het Volksprogram vervat zijn niet principieel onverenigbaar met het 
kapitalistisch karakter van onze maatschappij.’ 
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Page 22, Note 3: 
‘De vernieuwing van het politiek leven vereist dat geen der vooroorlogse partijen weer wordt 
opgericht. Daartoe is de oprichting van een nieuwe partij gewenst, een Democratische 
Volkspartij of Volksunie. Deze Democratische Volkspartij zal geen oppositie, doch een 
regeringspartij moeten zijn.’ 
 
Page 22, Note 4: 
‘Het gaat om de vereniging van alle democraten. (…) Die doel kan niet worden bereikt indien 
een nieuwe politieke formatie zou worden ontworpen op de grondslag van één 
wereldbeschouwing. Dit betekent geen beginselloosheid: wij wensen van onze beginselen 
geen afstand te doen. (…) Wat wij willen is dat de wrijving der principiële geschillen geen 
obstakel zijn voor een zo groot mogelijke machtsvorming der democratie binnen een 
organisatieverband.’ 
 
Page 23, Note 5: 
‘Deze middenklassen zijn de natuurlijke bondgenoten van de arbeidersklasse. (…) Het is de 
taak van de arbeidersbeweging deze en andere vooruitstrevende bewegingen uit de 
middenklassen om zich heen te verzamelen tot een democratisch front, om allen, die door de 
politiek van het grootkapitaal bedreigd en getroffen worden tot een vooruitstrevend blok 
tesamen te smeden. 
 
Page 24, Note 6: 
‘Zo’n politiek, zoals die sinds de bevrijding in Nederland is gevoerd en uitgaat van de 
gedachte, dat socialistische eisen niet onmiddellijk aan de orde zijn en “daarom” het vormen 
van een socialistische partij niet in de eerste plaats noodzakelijk is, moet dan ook als een 
opportunistische politiek verworpen worden. (…) Het treffendst komt dit tot uiting in de 
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conceptie van de z.g.n. volkspartij waarbij men is uitgegaan van volkomen foutieve gedachten 
omtrent het karakter der partijen in een burgerlijke maatschappij.’ 
 
Page 24, Note 7: 
‘Wij hebben uit het oog verloren dat voor het totstandbrengen van de eenheidspartij der 
arbeidersklasse en de vereniging aller democratische krachten het bestaan van de marxistisch-
leninistische partij voorwaarde is. De “Waarheidsbeweging” is voor het duurzaam en 
succesvol verwerkelijken van deze politiek onvoldoende. (…) De opvatting om de vereniging 
van democratische groeperingen samen met de “Waarheidsbeweging” in de vorm van een 
partij, de volkspartij, tot stand te brengen, leidt tot begripsverwarring. Hier kan geen sprake 
van een partij zijn, doch moet men streven naar een beweging of verbond van democratische 
groeperingen, waarin de arbeiderspartij haar eigen, zelfstandige partij bezit.’ 
 
Page 25, Note 8: 
‘Deze negatie van de zelfstandige partijvorming van het proletariaat blijkt het treffendst uit 
het afwijzen van iedere eenheids politiek tegenover de sociaal-democratie.’ 
 
Page 25, Note 9: 
‘[Uitgaande van bovenstaande overwegingen] stellen wij U, kameraden van de SDAP, voor 
om met onze partij een vriendschappelijke en blijvende samenwerking tot stand te brengen in 
de actie voor de naaste taken, die voor ons volk in dezen tijd gerezen zijn.’ 
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Page 25, Note 10: 
‘Doch wij willen daarbij niet blijven stilstaan. Wij achten het onze dringende plicht voor U 
het vraagstuk van de samensmelting onzer beide partijen tot een grote en sterke arbeiderspartij 
aan de orde te stellen.’ 
 
Page 26, Note 11: 
‘Niet alleen de S.D.A.P. weigerde de eenheid der arbeidsklasse to stand te brengen, ook de 
andere democratische organisaties toonden, niet in staat te zijn een positieve en vruchtbare 
eenheidspolitiek te voeren die voor het weerstandsvermogen van het Nederlandse volk toch 
zo noodzakelijk was.’  
 
Page 26, Note 12:  
‘Intussen kunnen wij ook om redenen van actueel politiek beleid geen heil verwachten van 
een samenwerking, eventueel van een fusie met Uw partij. (...) Zolang deze methode door U 
in pracktijk gebracht wordt, heeft het geen enkele zin over samenwerking, te zwijgen over 
fusie een woord te verliezen.’ 
 
Page 26, Note 13: 
‘Daarom is het zo belangrijk dat partijgenoten zich niet van de massa afscheiden, maar 
contacten leggen met andere groepen.’ 
 
Page 27, Note 14: 
‘Laat ons de doorbraak tot stand brengen, door een verbond van soc. dem. en communisten bij 
de a.s. verkiezingen! (…) Een verbond van sociaal-democraten en communisten kan de kern 
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vormen van breed democratisch blok, waarop na de Verkiezingen een werkelijk 
vooruitstrevende regering kan worden gebouwd.’ 
 
Page 27, Note 15: 
‘SAMENWERKING VAN SOCIALISTEN EN COMMUNISTEN voor het voorbereiden en 
totstandbrengen van een werkelijke democratische regering die de waarborg is voor een 
vooruitstrevende koers, zowel in binnenland, als in Indonesië, als in het buitenlands beleid.’ 
 
Page 27, Note 16: 
‘Zij is bereid aan de regering deel te nemen en de verantwoordelijkheid voor het besturen van 
het land mede te dragen.’ 
 
Page 30-31, Note 4: 
‘Laten wij allereerst vaststellen, wat de sociaal-democratie eigenlijk is. Zij is niet anders, dan 
de afspiegeling van de politiek van het kapitalisme in de arbeidersbeweging. Ongetwijfeld is 
de P.v.d.A. in dit opzicht nog erger dan alle andere sociaal-democratische partijen.’ 
 
Page 31, Note 5: 
‘De P.v.d.A. heeft zich (…) in de afgelopen jaren als voornaamste hulptroep van Amerika, en 
uiterste scherpslijper tegen het communisme, opgeworpen.’ 
 
Page 32, Note 6: 
‘Tijdens de tweede wereldoorlog streefde onze partij naar samenwerking met alle 
tegenstanders van Hitler-Duitsland en Japan en was er in de laatste periode van de bezetting 
contact tot stand gekomen met de illegale groepen, die zich op Londen oriënteerden op 
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grondslag van een compromis met de sociaal democratie en de ‘linkse burgerlijke elementen.’ 
Hierdoor werden in de partij illusies omtrent een vreedzame ontwikkeling en samenwerking 
ná de oorlog in de hand gewerkt. Rondom het einde van de bezetting trad een grondige 
verandering in. Onder bescherming van Britse troepen kwam onder het kabinet Schermerhorn 
de reactie weer in het zadel en begon haar offensief tegen de arbeidersklasse en de 
vooruitstrevende krachten in het land. Onze partij heeft in overeenstemming met deze 
wijziging in de toestand, die een uitvloeisel was van de verbreking van de overeenkomsten 
van Yalta en Potsdam door de Anglo-Amerikaanse imperialisten, haar politiek vastgesteld.’ 
 
Page 32, Note 7: 
‘Wij hebben de laatste 1½ jaar in het middelpunt van de propaganda voor onze strijd gesteld 
de strijd tegen het Marshall-plan, waarvan alle gevolgen voor ons land bekend zijn en de strijd 
tegen de koloniale politiek van de Nederlandse regering.’ 
 
Page 34, Note 11: 
‘Het weerzinwekkende verraad van de leiders van de PVDA aan de beginselen van de 
socialistische arbeidersbeweging in de prackijk van het recht van ·elk volk op zelfstandigheid, 
inzake de pracktijk om orde op zaken te stellen volgens eigen wensen, zonder enige vreemde 
of buitenlandse inmenging, wordt duidelijker, naarmate de ontwikkeling der gebeurtenissen 
rondom de verhouding Nederland-Indonesië helderder in de herinnering wordt 
teruggeroepen.’ 
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Page 34, Note 12: 
‘Het Amerika van Truman en Marshall is er op uit de wereldheerschappij te veroveren door 
zijn geldmacht, de tijdelijke voorsprong van zijn productievermogen, corruptie, politieke 
reactie en militair geweld.’ 
 
Page 34, Note 13: 
‘Het plan-Marshall is dan ook in de eerste plaats een plan tot hulp aan Amerika, ten koste van 
de uitmergeling der landen die de Amerikaanse voogdij aanvaarden.’ 
 
Page 35, Note 17: 
‘Dit verdrag immers is een der vele voorwaarden van het Marshall plan. Niet door het 
initiatief van een der betrokken landen is dit verdrag tot stand gekomen, maar onder druk van 
Amerika, dat niet bereid was het Marshallplan uit te voeren zonder dit verdrag.’ 
 
Page 39, Note 5: 
‘In de strijd tegen den gemeenschappelijken vijand zullen wij de eenheid, die in de oorlog is 
gegroeid, moeten vastleggen in een alle werkers van hoofd en hand omvattende vakbeweging. 
Voorwaarde voor het bereiken van dit doel is, dat de nieuwe beweging los staat van bepaalde 
politieke partijen, dat zij evenmin een verlengstuk wordt van bepaald godsdienstig streven.’ 
 
Page 39-40, Note 7: 
‘ONS LAND, als kleine natie in de rijen volkeren, heeft een schitterende bijdrage geleverd 
[aan de bevrijding van het land] door zijn eenheid, wij zullen deze eenheid onder geen 
voorwaarde verloren laten gaan.’ 
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Page 40, Note 8: 
‘Deze bonden moeten bereiden zijn elke arbeider, van welke religieuze of politieke 
achtergrond hij of zij mag zijn, te accepteren, die aan de criteria voldoet en het doel en de 
grondbeginselen van de Unie accepteert.’ 
 
Page 40, Note 9: 
‘De besturen van het N.V.V. en de E.V.C. verklaren dat het A.N.V.B. de verwezenlijking van 
zijn doeleinden zal nastreven door middel van overleg. Eerst wanneer dit overleg niet to 
redelijke resultaten leidt, zal, met volledige inachtneming van het algemeen welzijn, de 
democratische rechtsorde en de bijzonder moeilijke omstandigheden, waarin ons land thans 
verkeert, tot het neerlagen van de arbeid kunnen worden overgegaan.’ 
 
Page 42, Note 15: 
‘Er dreigt gevaar. (...) Onze strijdbare eenheid, geboren uit de nood en het leed dat 
kapitalisme over ons bracht en gestaald en gelouterd in zware, opofferende strijd, wordt met 
de ondergang bedreigd. (…) Dit Fusie-rapport kan de toets der critiek niet doorstaan. Het is 
een Liquidatie-rapport.’ 
 
Page 43, Note 17: 
 ‘Ondanks alle gehits, ondanks alle gewroet, zal de eenheid zegevieren. De fusie tussen N.V.V. 
en E.V.C., door de vijanden van de arbeidersklasse met lede ogen tegemoet gezien, sluit het 
tijdperk der verdeeldheid af en luidt het nieuwe zegevierende tijdperk der eenheid in.’ 
